The author believes that contemporary psychoanalysis has shifted its emphasis from the understanding of the symbolic meaning of dreams, play, and associations to the exploration of the processes of thinking, dreaming, and playing. In this paper, he discusses his understanding of three forms of thinking-magical thinking, dream thinking, and transformative thinking-and provides clinical illustrations in which each of these forms of thinking figures prominently. The author views magical thinking as a form of thinking that subverts genuine thinking and psychological growth by substituting invented psychic reality for disturbing external reality. By contrast, dream thinking--our most profound form of thinking-involves viewing an emotional experience from multiple perspectives simultaneously: for example, the perspectives of primary process and secondary process thinking. In transformative thinking, one creates a new way of ordering experience that allows one to generate types of feeling, forms of object relatedness, and qualities of aliveness that had previously been unimaginable.

The author offers a close reading of portions of Fairbairn's work in which he not only explicates and clarifies Fairbairn's thinking, but generates ideas of his own by developing concepts that he believes to be implicit in, or logical extensions of, Fairbairn's work. Among the unstated or underdeveloped aspects of Fairbairn's contribution that the author discusses are (1) the idea that the formation of the internal object world is always, in part, a response to trauma (actual failure on the part of the mother to convey to her infant a sense that she loves him and accepts his love);(2) the notion that the infant's unceasing efforts to transform the internalized relationship with the unloving mother into a loving relationship - thus reversing the effect on his mother of his (imagined)'toxic love'- is the single most important motivation sustaining the structure of the internal object world; and (3) the idea that attacks on oneself for the way one loves, while self-destructive, contain a glimmer of insight into one's own self-hatred and shame regarding one's endless, futile attempts to change oneself (or the rejecting object) into a different person. The author, using his own clinical work, illustrates the way he makes use of his understanding of the 'emotional life' of internal objects to facilitate the patient's emotional growth.

The ways in which Kafka and Borges struggled with the creation of consciousness in their lives and in their literary works are explored in this two-part essay. In Part II, a biographical sketch of Jorge Luis Borges is juxtaposed with a close reading of one of his fictions,"The Library of Babel"(1941a). In this story, the universe is an infinite Library, a psychological/literary space comprised of books that contain everything that has ever been or ever will be written. By the end of the story, Borges becomes a character in his own fiction. This development was paralleled in Borges's "real life" as he invented a persona named "Borges," a literary creation that allowed Borges to become a character in a story that was his life. The essay concludes with a comparison of the ways in which Borges and Kafka each used writing as a way of creating his own distinctive form of consciousness, and, in so doing, contributed to the creation of twentieth-century consciousness.

The ways in which Franz Kafka and Jorge Luis Borges struggled with the creation of consciousness in their lives and in their literary works are explored in this two-part essay. In Part I, the author juxtaposes a biographical sketch of Kafka with a close reading of his story "A Hunger Artist"(1924), in which a character (whose personality holds much in common with that of Kafka) spends his life in a quasi-delusional state starving himself in public performances. The hunger artist's self-awareness (of having lived a life devoid of the experience of love and mutual recognition) is achieved in the context of an interpersonal experience in which he has, in fact, found/created "the food [he] liked," that is, an experience of loving and being loved, of seeing and being seen, of being aware of and alive to his own imminent death. This fragile, paradoxical state of consciousness is sustained for only a moment before it is attacked, but not entirely destroyed.

One has the opportunity and responsibility to become an analyst in one's own terms in the course of the years of practice that follow the completion of formal analytic training. The authors discuss their understanding of some of the maturational experiences that have contributed to their becoming analysts in their own terms. They believe that the most important element in the process of their maturation as analysts has been the development of the capacity to make use of what is unique and idiosyncratic to each of them; each, when at his best, conducts himself as an analyst in a way that reflects his own analytic style; his own way of being with, and talking with, his patients; his own form of the practice of psychoanalysis. The types of maturational experiences that the authors examine include situations in which they have learned to listen to themselves speak with their patients and, in so doing, begin to develop a voice of their own; experiences of growth that have occurred in the context of presenting clinical material to a consultant; making self-analytic use of their experience with their patients; creating/discovering themselves as analysts in the experience of analytic writing (with particular attention paid to the maturational experience involved in writing the current paper); and responding to a need to keep changing, to be original in their thinking and behavior as analysts.

The author finds that the idea of analytic style better describes significant aspects of the way he practices psychoanalysis than does the notion of analytic technique. The latter is comprised to a large extent of principles of practice developed by previous generations of analysts. By contrast, the concept of analytic style, though it presupposes the analyst's thorough knowledge of analytic theory and technique, emphasizes (1) the analyst's use of his unique personality as reflected in his individual ways of thinking, listening, and speaking, his own particular use of metaphor, humor, irony, and so on;(2) the analyst's drawing on his personal experience, for example, as an analyst, an analysand, a parent, a child, a spouse, a teacher, and a student;(3) the analyst's capacity to think in a way that draws on, but is independent of, the ideas of his colleagues, his teachers, his analyst, and his analytic ancestors; and (4) the responsibility of the analyst to invent psychoanalysis freshly for each patient. Close readings of three of Bion's 'Clinical seminars' are presented in order to articulate some of the elements of Bion's analytic style. Bion's style is not presented as a model for others to emulate or, worse yet, imitate; rather, it is described in an effort to help the reader consider from a different vantage point (provided by the concept of analytic style) the way in which he, the reader, practices psychoanalysis.

Many patients are unable to engage in waking-dreaming in the analytic setting in the form of free association or in any other form. The author has found that 'talking-as-dreaming' has served as a form of waking-dreaming in which such patients have been able to begin to dream formerly undreamable experience. Such talking is a loosely structured form of conversation between patient and analyst that is often marked by primary process thinking and apparent non sequiturs. Talking-as-dreaming superficially appears to be 'unanalytic' in that it may seem to consist 'merely' of talking about such topics as books, films, etymology, baseball, the taste of chocolate, the structure of light, and so on. When an analysis is 'a going concern,' talking-as-dreaming moves unobtrusively into and out of talking about dreaming. The author provides two detailed clinical examples of analytic work with patients who had very little capacity to dream in the analytic setting. In the first clinical example, talking-as-dreaming served as a form of thinking and relating in which the patient was able for the first time to dream her own (and, in a sense, her father's) formerly unthinkable, undreamable experience. The second clinical example involves the use of talking-as-dreaming as an emotional experience in which the formerly 'invisible' patient was able to begin to dream himself into existence. The analyst, while engaging with a patient in talking-as-dreaming, must remain keenly aware that it is critical that the difference in roles of patient and analyst be a continuously felt presence; that the therapeutic goals of analysis be firmly held in mind; and that the patient be given the opportunity to dream himself into existence (as opposed to being dreamt up by the analyst).

Direct optimization frameworks for simultaneously estimating alignments and phylogenies have recently been developed. One such method, implemented in the program POY, is becoming more common for analyses of variable length sequences (e.g., analyses using ribosomal genes) and for combined evidence analyses (morphology + multiple genes). Simulation of sequences containing insertion and deletion events was performed in order to directly compare a widely used method of multiple sequence alignment (ClustalW) and subsequent parsimony analysis in PAUP* with direct optimization via POY. Data sets were simulated for pectinate, balanced, and random tree shapes under different conditions (clocklike, non-clocklike, and ultrametric). Alignment accuracy scores for the implied alignments from POY and the multiple sequence alignments from ClustalW were calculated and compared. In almost all cases (99.95%), ClustalW produced more accurate alignments than POY-implied alignments, judged by the proportion of correctly identified homologous sites. Topological accuracy (distance to the true tree) for POY topologies and topologies generated under parsimony in PAUP* from the ClustalW alignments were also compared. In 44.94% of the cases, Clustal alignment tree reconstructions via PAUP* were more accurate than POY, whereas in 16.71% of the cases POY reconstructions were more topologically accurate (38.38% of the time they were equally accurate). Comparisons between POY hypothesized alignments and the true alignments indicated that, on average, as alignment error increased, topological accuracy decreased.

Through a close reading of two of Searles's papers, the author explores not only what Searles thinks, but the way he thinks and how he works with patients. Searles makes use of a form of emotional responsiveness to the transference-countertransference that entails a seamless continuity of conscious and unconscious receptivity and thought. His unflinchingly honest descriptions of what is occurring in the transference-countertransference seem, as if of their own accord, to generate original clinical theory, for example, a reconceptualization of what is entailed in the successful analysis of the Oedipus complex. He demonstrates his own distinctive form of analytic thinking and interpreting, which the author describes as 'turning experience inside out'. Searles, in clinical example after clinical example, transforms what had been the invisible, unnameable emotional context of the patient's experience into verbally symbolized psychological content that is thinkable and speakable. In the final section of the paper, the author discusses an important (and unexpected) complementarity of the work of Searles and Bion. Searles's work provides clinical shape and vitality for Bion's often abstract theoretical constructions, such as the concept of the container-contained, the human need for truth, and the relationship of conscious and unconscious experience. At the same time, Bion's work provides a broader theoretical context for Searles's work.